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ABSTRACT
Intelligent Personal Assistant (IA), also known as Voice Assistant
(VA), has become increasingly popular as a human-computer in-
teraction mechanism. Most smartphones have built-in voice assis-
tants that are granted high privilege, which is able to access system
resources and private information. Thus, once the voice assistants
are exploited by attackers, they become the stepping stones for
the attackers to hack into the smartphones. Prior work shows that
the voice assistant can be activated by inter-component communi-
cation mechanism, through an official Android API. However, this
attackmethod is only effective onGoogle Assistant, which is the of-
ficial voice assistant developed by Google. Voice assistants in other
operating systems, even custom Android systems, cannot be acti-
vated by this mechanism. Prior work also shows that the attacking
voice commands can be inaudible, but it requires additional instru-
ments to launch the attack, making it unrealistic for real-world
attack. We propose an attacking framework, which records the ac-
tivation voice of the user, and launch the attack by playing the
activation voice and attack commands via the built-in speaker. An
intelligent stealthy module is designed to decide on the suitable
occasion to launch the attack, preventing the attack being noticed
by the user. We demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks on Google
Assistant, showing the feasibility and stealthiness of the proposed
attack scheme. We suggest to revise the activation logic of voice
assistant to be resilient to the speaker based attack.
KEYWORDS
Android security; voice assistant; voice attack; context-aware at-
tack; speaker
1 INTRODUCTION
With the recent boost in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Speech
Recognition (SR) technologies, theVoiceAssistant (VA), also known
as the Intelligent personal Assistant (IA), has become increasingly
popular as a human-computer interaction mechanism. Voice assis-
tants, such as Amazon Echo&Alexa, Samsung Bixby, Google As-
sistant, and Apple Siri , are widely adopted in smart devices and
smartphones[1, 6, 12, 20]. Instead of interacting with the smart-
phones by touching the screen, users can send the voice commands
to activate the voice assistant on smartphones, and ask him to per-
form the tasks, such as sending text messages, browsing the Inter-
net, playing music and videos, and so on [19].
While voice assistants bring convenience to our daily lives, it
also offers a backdoor for hackers to hack into our smartphones.
Voice assistant on smartphones are usually granted high privileges
to access various apps and system services, thus it can be utilised
as a weapon to launch attacks to our smartphones, such as to un-
lock smartphones without fingerprints or PINs, forge emails, con-
trol smart home devices, and even transfer money [15]. For exam-
ple, after activating the Google Assistant with the keywords “OK
Google”, you can send money to your contacts through Google Pay
with the command such as “send Bob $50 for the dinner last night.”
Prior works[1, 9, 12, 29] have demonstrated the success of at-
tacking the smartphone via the voice assistant. The process usu-
ally includes two stage. In the first stage, the attacker stealthily
records the activation voice of the smartphone owner; then in the
second stage, the attacker replays the recorded activation voice to
activate the voice assistant, and perform further attacks by play-
ing pre-recorded voice commands. Though prior works showed
the feasibility of such attacking model, they did not consider the
awareness of the smartphone owner when launching the second
stage, as the activation voice and the attacking voice commands
are played via the speaker on the smartphone, there is some chance
that the owner would be aware of it. In this paper, we propose a
novel approach to employ Artificial Intelligent techniques to hack
the voice assistants on Android smartphones. We aim to answer
the following two questions: (1) how to collect the activation voice
in a stealthily way; (2) how to determine a smart time to launch
the attack without user’s consciousness.
We developed a proof-of-concept spyware app, and disguise it
as a popular microphone controlled game app, which reasonably
requests the permission to access the microphone. The spyware
records the incoming and outgoing calls stealthily, and synthesise
the activation keywords (e.g. “OK Google”) by adopting Nature
Language Processing (NLP) techniques. After the activation key-
words are synthesised, the spyware monitors and obtains the en-
vironment light and noisy data by employing the accelerometer,
the ambient light sensor, and the microphone. The collected data
are fed into a Machine Learning based environment recogniser to
decide whether it is a optimal time to launch the attack. The work-
ing flow of the proposed attack model is demonstrated in Figure. 1.
We tested the spyware on both industrial anti-virus products, and
academic research schemes. None of them can detect the spyware.
The major contributions of this paper are summarised as fol-
lows.
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Figure 1: The working flow of proposed attack model
• We proposed an attacking model that stealthily hacks into
smartphones via the built-in Voice Assistants, without the
awareness of the user.
• Wedesigned an intelligent environment detector to launch
context-awareness attacks. We categorise the ambient en-
vironment into six real world scenarios, according to the
data collected from the smartphone sensors. The environ-
ment detector determines the optimal time to launch the
attack, based on analysis in current scenario.
• We developed a proof-of-concept spyware to practise the
attack in real world. We analysed its power and computa-
tion resources consumption. The results showed that the
developed spyware did not noticeably influence the per-
formance of Android phones. We also tested it in both the
industrial and academic malware detection solutions. We
found that all those detection methods could not capture
the new spyware.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the background of the voice assistant. In Section 3, a novel attack-
ing framework via built-in speaker to attack voice assistant is pro-
posed. Proof-of-concept attacks are demonstrated.A context-awareness
stealthy attacking module, together with evaluation, is presented
in Section 4. The infection method and the resistance to current
Anti-virus tools are presented in Section 5, along with the anal-
ysis of the power and computation resources consumption. Sec-
tion 6 discusses the defence strategies, and some in-depth topics.
A critical review on related works on attacks to voice assistant,
and context-awareness attacks are presented in Section7. Section
8 concludes this paper.
2 VOICE ASSISTANT PRIMER
Voice assistant is a typical application in artificial intelligence field.
It is widely used for human-machine chatting, device control, and
identity authentication [17]. Because human beings speak around
150 words per minute but can only write 40 words per minute on
average, an efficient voice recognition function will be very useful
for devices like smartphones or computers to transform speeches
into machine-readable texts. Currently, the voice assistant tech-
nique has been embedded into most smartphones and many apps,
such as Apple Siri, Google Now, Cortana, and WeChat Voice Ac-
tivation [8, 13, 16]. These products are very intelligent, not only
recognising what human beings are saying, not also identifying
who are the speakers for authentication purpose.
Figure 2:word-basedmanipulation vs. syllable-basedmanip-
ulation: the former requires to record the whole activation
keyword, with a high successful activation rate, while the
latter only requires to record the words that contains sylla-
bles of the activation keyword, but with a lower successful
activation rate
Existing voice assistants basically contain two functions: voice
control and feedback. They can interact with human beings by re-
ceiving requests and sending feedback purely via voice just like
talking with a real person. Because voice assistants usually have
high authorisation in host systems, people can control the systems
by inputting their sound. The first step is to deliver the activa-
tion command (e.g., ‘hello, Siri’ for iPhone) to activate the system.
Once the voice assistant has been activated, people can issue a re-
quest/command via voice to execute a specific function, such as
making phone calls, playing music, sending messages. Our devel-
oped spyware will attack the voice assistant function in Android
phones. The basic idea is to activate voice assistant through ma-
nipulated sound from the speakers on the phones themselves. The
spyware can then launch a series of malicious operations through
the same channel once the voice assistant has been activated. We
have summarised the malicious operations that can be done once
the spyware succeeds in the activation (see details in Section 3.3).
3 ATTACK ON VOICE ASSISTANTS
3.1 Attack model
To protect the privacy of Android users, android apps must request
permissions to access sensitive user data (such as SMS and con-
tacts), as well as system features (such as camera and Internet). Cur-
rent voice assistants (such as Google Assistant and Samsung Bixby)
has been granted a great number of permissions, some of which
are high risk permissions such as reading and writing private in-
formation, getting and setting phone settings, as well as accessing
system resources. Once the voice assistant is compromised, attack-
ers can control the device via sending voice command to the voice
assistant, such as making phone calls to specific numbers, sending
out current geographical location via email/SMS, and switch off
the Bluetooth, etc.
The attack model include State Monitoring and Voice Record-
ing(SMVR), Activation Voice Manipulation (AVM), Intelligent En-
vironment Detection(IED), VoiceAssistant Activation and Control(VAC).
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SMVR module monitors the state of the smartphone, when the mi-
crophone on the smartphone is activated (e.g. there is an incom-
ing/outgoing call), it starts recording the voice that themicrophone
receives. AVM module then process the recorded voice, and craft
the activation keywords that is required to activate the voice as-
sistant. In the IED module, we design a novel scenario recognition
scheme, which collects ambient data (e.g. light level, noisy level)
through built-in sensors on the smartphone, and intelligently clas-
sify the current status into one of six finely designed real world sce-
narios, which determines whether it is a suitable time to launch the
attack, and what is the optimal volume to play the attacking voice.
If the result obtained from IED module is positive, VAC module
plays the activation voice that is synthesised by AVMmodule, and
attacking commands, in a certain volume that is determined by IED
module.
3.2 Activation Voice Manipulation
The built-in voice assistant can be activated either by touching and
holding the home button, or by saying the activation words such
as "OK Google", if the user enabled the voice activation option. The
voice activation command is trained by the user’s own voice to en-
sure that the voice assistant can only be activated by the user him-
self. However, besides the user saying the activation words, replay-
ing the recorded voice of the user can also activate the voice assis-
tant. Once the voice assistant is activated, the followed voice com-
mands do not need to match the voice of the user. Voice commands
from any sources would be executed by the voice assistant, as long
as the voice command can be recognised. From the attacker’s point
of view, the voice command can be pre-recorded audio files by at-
tacker, or generated with the built-in Text To Speech (TTS) service
on smartphones. Such mechanism makes the activation phase a
stepping stone to control the smartphone.
The activation keywords usually consist of a greeting word (such
as OK, Hi, Hey, etc.) followed by the name of the voice assistant
(such as Google, Bixby, Siri, etc.) The aim of AVM module is to
obtain the voice of the activation keywords that pronounced by
the user. The original voice that we recorded are long sentences,
so that speech recognition techniques are employed to process
the voice and synthesise the activation keyword. We propose two
methods for activation key synthesis, namely word-based manip-
ulation, and syllable-based manipulation. Figure. 2 illustrates the
process of these two methods.
Word-basedmanipulation.Word-basedmanipulation requires
to obtain the voice of the whole activation keywords. After the
voices are recorded, the AVM module extracts the activation key-
words and store them as audio files. Since some of the activation
keywords are not usually said in the daily conversation, social en-
gineering attacking methods can be used to improve the chance
of recording the whole activation keywords. For example, in order
to record the activation keyword "Google", the attacker may call
the target victim and pretend to conduct a market survey, by ask-
ing "which search engine do you usually use?" The success rate of
using word-based manipulation to synthesise the activation key-
words achieved 100% success rate in our experiments.
Syllable-basedmanipulation.Collecting thewhole activation
word is a time consuming task, especiallywhen the activationwords
Figure 3: Main different between MediaRecorder and Au-
dioRecord, this two recordingmethod will output the same
result.
contains some proper nouns, such as "Bixby". As a result we pro-
pose a syllable-based voice manipulation method, which only re-
quires to record the syllables with the same pronunciation as the
activation words. Taking the activation words "OK, Google" as an
example, "OK" contain two syllables (O-K), which can be synthe-
sised by "Oh" and "Cake". "Google" contain two syllables (Goo-gle),
which can be synthesised by "Good" and "Go". When an incom-
ing/outgoing call is detected, the AVM module records the rele-
vant syllables and stores them in a audio file. Once each syllables
are recorded, the AVM module syntheses the activation keywords
from the collected syllables. Though Syllable-based manipulation
is more flexible, it has lower successful rate compared as word-
based manipulation. Approximate 40% of the activation keywords
that are synthesised by syllables can successfully activate the voice
assistant.
3.3 Proof-of-Concept Attack
A prototype spyware is developed and to be installed on the victim
smartphone (the details about the spyware and its delivery meth-
ods are discussed in Section 5).
Voice recording.The spyware registered itself as a service, which
monitors the phone call status of the smartphone. Once the call-
back function onCallStateChanged[5] is invoked, it begins to
record the audio from microphone. MediaRecorder[4] and Au-
dioRecord[2] are two classes in Android for recording audio, with
MediaRecorder, the audio is recorded into a file after the record-
ing is finished, while with AudioRecord, the recorded audio are
cached in RAM, and APIs are provided to process the audio while
recording is still in progress. We use AudioRecord to achieve real-
time voice synthesis. We segment the recorded audio every twenty
seconds, to avoid recorded audio being overwritten. The recording
process stops until the phone call is ended, or until the activation
keyword "OK Google" is successfully synthesised.
Voice recognition and synthesis.We apply real-time speech
recognition to synthesis the target activation keywords.When record-
ing is in process, we read the recorded audio segments from the
RAM, pre-processing the audio to eliminate the segments that do
not include human voice, and use iFlytek speech recognition SDK
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Figure 4: Overview of data collected in six real-world scenarios
to recognise and synthesise the activation keywords. Voice synthe-
sis is working in both word-based and syllable-based modes. Once
the activation keywords are synthesised, we save it as "key.wav",
and validate the activation keywords by recognising it with iFly-
tek speech recognition SDK. If the recognised result is the same
as the activation keyword, the State Monitoring and Voice Record-
ing (SMVR) modulewould be disabled, and the Intelligent Environ-
ment Detection (IED) module is activated to collect environment
data.
Environmentdetection.Once the activation keywords are syn-
thesised, the IEDmodule starts to collect data from themicrophone,
the ambient light sensor, and the accelerometer. Based on the col-
lected environment data, the IED module determines whether to
launch an attack. Details of Environment detection module is dis-
cussed in Section 4.
Launching the attack. Once the environment detection algo-
rithm determines to launch the attack, the synthesised activation
voice would be played via the speaker on the victim smartphone.
Meanwhile, the attacking commands, which are in text format, are
fetched from Firebase [1]. Firebase provides a realtime database
and backend as a service. The service provides an API that allows
application data to be synchronized across clients and stored on
Firebase’s cloud.With Firebase, we are able to dynamically change
the attacking commands depends on the target of the attack. At-
tacking commands are converted to speech using the built-in Text-
To-Speech service, before played via the speaker.
Post-attacking scenarios and capabilities. Voice Assistants
are granted with high privilege, which is able to access system re-
sources and private information. For instance, we can use Google
Assistant to send SMS and emails, take photos, open other apps,
take screen shots, and even transfer money via Google Pay [15].
With voicewake function, the smartphonewould be unlockedwith-
out PIN or fingerprints, once the voice assistant is activated. As a
result, once the attackers obtain the activation voice of the voice as-
sistant, they can hack into victims’ smartphones, nomatterwhether
they have the phones or not.
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Figure 5: Sample data collected from scenario (a) walking on a quiet road; and (d) taking public transportation.
4 STEALTHY ATTACKING MODULE
In this section, we present the technical details of Intelligent Envi-
ronment Detection module and its triggering algorithm.
4.1 Challenges
After the attacker acquires the activation voice from the user, a
critical question arises and yet to be answered, that is, when is the
good time to launch the attack? Obviously, there are many factors
to be considered, such as whether the user is holding or interacting
with the phone, whether the sound would be noticed by the user
when launching the attack, whether the sound would be "heard" by
the phone when launching the attack, and so on. The question is
critical because once the attack is noticed by the user, he may look
into the issue, and there would not be a second chance to launch
the attack. Existing works [1, 12] gather the state of the phone
from sensors on smartphones (e.g. light sensor and accelerometer)
and system attributes (e.g. current system time and screen on/off
status), but the attack would only be triggered under certain con-
ditions. For example, in [12], attack would only be launched at the
night, when the phone is screen-off and put on a horizontal table
with room lamp is off. As different users may have different habits,
this kind of pre-set conditions may never be met. The volume of
the sound that played to launch the attack is also an important
factor that affects the success of attacking. The volume should be
low enough to avoid being heard by the user, and high enough to
make sure the attack voice command can be received by the smart-
phone. The optimal volume varies depends on the noise level of
the surroundings as well as the real-world scenario that the phone
is in.
4.2 Triggering Algorithm
To tackle the above mentioned challenges, we propose an Intel-
ligent Environment Detection module, which makes decision on
when to launch the attack, and what is the optimal volume to play
attack voice commands, by analysing the data collected from the
ambient, together with the state of the phone.
Sensor set-up.We collect data frommicrophone, ambient light
sensor, and accelerometer. Smartphones do not have a built-in noise
sensor, thus we record the ambient sound via microphone, and cal-
culate the noise level in decibel with the following formula.
LdB = 10 loд10
(
A21
A20
)
where A1 is the amplitude of the recorded sound, and A0 is a stan-
dard amplitude that we set to 1. To model the movement patterns,
we collect the data from the accelerometer in a frequency of 50 Hz.
To save to power consumption, we collect the noise and light data
every 200ms, as they are more stable than the movement data in
a short period of time. All of the collected data are resampled to
50Hz with Nearest Neighbour Interpolation. We collected the lock
screen on/off statuswith the systemAPI PowerManager.isInteractive(),
and bluetooth and headphone connection status with AudioMan-
ager.getDevices().
Data Collection. We collected the training data in six typi-
cal real-world scenarios, which includes motion/stationary states,
noisy/quiet states, bright/dark states: (a) walking/jogging on the
quite road; (b) walking/running along the highway; (c) walking in
specific places; (d) taking public transportation; (e) driving/sitting
in a car; and (f) eating in restaurant. In all of the scenarios, we
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Table 1: Success rate in each scenario
Being
Noticed
Successfully
Attacked
Success
Rate
Scenario(a) 20 / 20 0 / 20 0 %
Scenario(b) 0 / 20 18 / 20 90 %
Scenario(c) 24 / 40 13 / 40 32.5 %
Scenario(d) 0 / 20 17 / 20 85 %
Scenario(e) 20 / 20 0 / 20 0 %
Scenario(f) 0 / 20 19 / 20 95 %
collected the data of putting the phone in the pocket, as well as
holding the phone on hands.
We find ten volunteers to collect the data in each of the above
mentioned six scenarios, with Google Pixel 2 and Samsung Galaxy
S9. All of them were told the purpose of the experiment, which is
to make sure their attentions are not disturbed by other environ-
mental factors.
Table 2: "Movement intensity" Features
Motion
State
Stationary
State
Movement Intensity
0.70 0.30 Definite motion state
0.56 0.44 Relative motion-stationary state
0.85 0.15 Definite stationary state
0.45 0.55 Relative motion-stationary state
We prepared an activation voice that can successfully activate
Google Assistant in the devices, which would be played randomly
between one to five minutes after the experiments started. Once
the Google Assistant was activated, attacking commands, which
are in text format,would be fetched fromFirebase server and played
via the built-in Text-To-Speech (TTS) service. We record whether
the volunteer noticed the sounds, and whether the attack com-
mands were successfully executed byGoogleAssistant. Note that if
the attacking voice are heard by the volunteers, we label the attack
as failed even if it was successfully executed by Google Assistant.
Table.1 show that the success rate in each scenario.
The data that we collected from the sensors are noise level, light
level, and acceleration data in x,y,z axes. 20 groups of datawere col-
lected, each with length of 3 minute. Figure.4 shows the overview
of the collected data, and Figure. 5 shows the data collected from
three sensors in 1 minute.
Noise Removal. Raw signal usually contains noise that arises
from different sources, such as sensor miscalibration, sensor er-
rors, errors in sensor placement, or noisy environments and so
on. These noisy signal adversely affect the signal segmentation,
feature extraction and then significantly hamper activity predic-
tion. In our study, we used fourth order Butterworth low-pass filter
for the noise removal. Figure.6 compares the sensor signal pattern
with and without noise removal for the same activity.
FeatureExtraction. Fig.7 illustrates the framework of proposed
feature extraction approach, where the features that calculated from
Figure 6: Effect of butter wroth filter
Table 3: One Hot Encode "Movement intensity" Features
Movement Intensity One Hot Encode
Definite Motion state [0, 1]
Definite Stationary state [1, 0]
Relative Motion-stationary state [1, 1]
Figure 7: Feature Extraction Framework.
accelerometer as "movement intensity" and the features that ex-
tracted from noise sensor and light sensor as "environment vari-
ables". We used "movement intensity" features to describe an over-
all perspective of human behaviour state. We divided human be-
haviour state into definite motion state, definite stationary state
and relative motion-stationary state based on the class probabili-
ties of Random Forest (RF). The RF does not directly output class
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labels but probabilities, and then assign labels to the instances de-
pends on whether the probabilities exceed certain threshold. We
labelled the motion state with a threshold over 60% probability as
definite motion state, the stationary state with a threshold over
60% probability as definite stationary state, and the motion (or sta-
tionary) state with the probability between 40% to 60% as relative
motion-stationary state (as shown in Table.2). As "movement in-
tensity" features are categorical values and Machine learning al-
gorithms cannot work with them directly, we converted all the
"movement intensity" features to numerical values using One Hot
Encode as shown in Table.3. Environment variables were applied
for the purpose of providing more specific details on the uncer-
tain environmental factors, such as noise level and light intensity,
which can also affect the decision of whether to launch attack.
Table 4: Average Accuracy Performance
Precision Recall f1-score
Unsuccessful Invasion 0.96 0.95 0.95
Successful Invasion 0.97 0.98 0.98
Avg 0.97 0.97 0.97
Evaluation Methods and Results. We implement our algo-
rithm in python 3.6, using Scikit-learn 0.17.1 package which is
an open source Python library to implement machine learning al-
gorithms [23]. We evaluate classification algorithm based on four
metrics, which are True Positive rate, F1 measure, Precision, and
Recall. Table. 4 shows the overall performance of Random Forest
classifiers on detecting the effective attack opportunities based on
the 20-fold cross validation. Table.5 shows the parameter settings
of Random Forest classifier.
Table 5: Parameters for Random Forest
Random Forest
Parameters
’bootstrap’: True,
’criterion’: gini,
’max depth’: 10,
’number of estimators’: 200
Volume control. The output activation command requires to
reach a certain volume to be captured by the device. This trigger-
ing volume is affected by the environment noise level. To investi-
gate how environment noise affects the triggering volume, we test
the sufficient volume to activate the voice assistant, as well as to
trigger the voice attack. As in the proposed attack scenario, the
attacking voice commands are played via the speaker of the smart-
phone, so that the distance between the source of the sound and
the device is not considered. Table. 6 shows the minimal volume
of activating voice assistant and triggering voice attack.
4.3 Evaluation
We conducted a set of real-world experiments to test the feasibil-
ity of the Intelligent Environment Detection algorithm. Ten volun-
teers are involved in the experiments. The experiments are con-
ducted in different time period of a day, and in various real-world
Table 6: Minimal volume for successfully activating voice
assistant and triggering voice attack
Ambient
Noises
Activation
Commands
Attacking
Commands
30 dB 44 dB 40 dB
41 dB 44 dB 40 dB
52 dB 54 dB 54 dB
68 dB 67 dB 67 dB
73 dB 75 dB 76 dB
scenarios. Google Pixel 2 and Samsung Galaxy 9 are used in the
experiments. In every three minutes, the IED module collects data
from the sensors, and determines whether to launch the attack. If
an attack is launched in the three-minute time period, the IED
stops monitoring the environment, and wait for the next three-
minute time period. When the IED decides to launch the attack,
it first plays the activation voice, and then randomly fetch one of
the twenty voice commands from the Firebase server and convert
it to audio through TTS service.
Table. 7 shows the results of the experiments.We count the num-
ber of attack launched as if the IED module decides to launch the
attack. Either the voice commands cannot be recognised by the
voice assistant, or the volunteer heard the voice commands, we
consider the attack is failed. In the bus scenario, 20 attacks were
launched, with one attack failed, which is due to a sudden quiet
when the attack command is being played, and the volunteer no-
ticed the attacking voice. Only two and zero attacks are launched
in the university and classroom scenario, respectively, because it
is quiet in these two scenarios at most of the time. In restaurant
scenario, 19 attacks were launched, all of which were succeeded.
12 attacks were launched in supermarket scenario, and 10 of them
were succeeded. One of the two failures was caused by attack be-
ing noticed by the volunteer, and the other is because the voice
assistant cannot recognise the attack command.
5 DELIVERY & DETECTION AVOIDANCE
5.1 Spyware delivery and obfuscation.
We developed a proof-of-concept spyware on Android platform to
launch the attack, which can be is called as infection process[18, 25,
28]. Three permissions are required for the spyware to perform the
malicious activities, which are RECORD_AUDIO (to record the acti-
vation voice of the user), INTERNET (to dynamically fetch attack-
ing commands from Firebase server), and READ_PHONE_STATE
(to monitor incoming/outgoing call status).
The spyware is disguised as a popular microphone controlled
game named RocketGo. TheUI of RocketGo is displayed in Figure.8.
When playing the game, the player requires to blow or scream to
the microphone. The higher volume the microphone receives, the
faster the rocket flies. The game is controlled by microphone, so
that we can request for the RECORD_AUDIO permission without
being suspected by the user.We claim in the game that game scores
can be shared with friends in the contact list, so that we request
the permission of READ_PHONE_STATE and INTERNET . Actually,
these two permissions are very common in Android games. Five of
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Table 7: Evaluation of Intelligent Environment Detector module
Time Period Activity Number of Attack Launched Number of Attack Succeeded Success Rate
8:00-9:00 Sit on bus 20 19 95%
11:00-12:00 Walk in university 2 2 100%
13:00-14:00 Have lunch in restaurant 18 18 100%
15:00-16:00 Sit in classroom 0 0 N/A
19:00-20:00 Shop in supermarket 12 10 83.3%
Figure 8: The UI of RocketGo game. After player clicking
start button, the rocket will raise when player blows or
scream to the microphone. The rising speed depends on the
volume of sound that the microphone receives
the top10 games onGoogle Play requested the READ_PHONE_STATE
permission, while all of the top10 games requested the INTERNET
permission.
When RocketGo is launched, it registered itself as a service, which
monitors the phone call state. Once the activation voice is success-
fully synthesis, it stops monitoring the phone call state, and start
collecting environment data from the sensors to look for suitable
time to launch the attack. The service would run at background
even when user close the RocketGo app. User would not get any
prompts in the whole process.
5.2 Resistance to Anti-Virus Tools
We test the spyware against both industrial anti-malware tools, as
well as academic malware detection solutions. Android malware
detection approaches can be categorised into static tools and dy-
namic platforms, according to whether the candidate app needs
to be executed or not. Static approaches are based on analysing
static features of the app, such as the component of the app, the
permissions requested by the app, and the code itself. Dynamic ap-
proaches execute the app in a protected environment, provide all
the emulated resources it needs, and observe its malicious activi-
ties. For industrial anti-virus products, we test RocketGo on Virus-
Total, as well as the top 10 most popular anti-virus tools on Google
Figure 9: Power consumption of four phases: P1(Phone call
statemonitoring), P2(Recording and synthesising activation
command), P3(Environmentmonitoring), and P4(Attacking
via speaker)
Play, such as Norton Security and Antivirus, KasperskyMobile An-
tivirus, McAfee Mobile Security, and so on. None of them reported
ourRocketGo asmalicious.We also submit the RocketGo toGoogle
Play store, where submitted apps are tested against their dynamic
test platformGoogle Bouncer. RocketGo successfully passes the de-
tection of Google Bouncer. The detection result of Google Bouncer
and VirusTotal are present in Fig. 11. Note that we took down the
RocketGo app from the Google Play immediately after it passed
the test.
For academic malware detection solutions, we test RocketGo
with Drebin, which is a state-of-art machine learning based mal-
ware detection scheme[7]. We trained Drebin with 5,000 malware
samples shared by the authors of Drebin, and 5,000 benign apps
that we downloaded from APKPure. RocketGo is labelled as a be-
nign app. The results show the resistance of the proposed attacking
method to both industrial and academic malware detection tools.
5.3 Consumption Analysis
The proposed attacking process can be divided into four phases:
P1(Phone call statemonitoring), P2(Recording and synthesising ac-
tivation command), P3(Environment monitoring), and P4(Attacking
via speaker). We evaluate and analyse the power and memory con-
sumption of each phase.
Power consumption analysis.We install RocketGoonGoogle
Pixel 2 (with 3520mAh Battery) and Samsung Galaxy S9 (with 3000
mAh Battery), and test the power consumption on both of them.
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Figure 10: Memory consumption of four phases: P1(Phone
call state monitoring), P2(Recording and synthesising
activation command), P3(Environment monitoring), and
P4(Attacking via speaker)
Fig.9 reports the per minute power consumption of four attacking
phases, compared with playing 1080P video and music. The results
show that in P1, P2, and P4, the per minute power consumption on
both devices are very low (approximately 0.2 mAh, 0.1 mAh, and
0.1 mAh, respectively). P3 has the highest power consumption dur-
ing the whole attacking process, which is approximately 0.8 mAh
per minute. It is still negligible when compared with playing video
and listening to music, which consumes 6.1 mAh and 5.1 mAh per
minute, respectively. We further reduce the frequency of collect-
ing data from sensors in P3 from 50Hz to 10Hz (i.e. 10 groups of
data collected per second), the power consumption reduced to 0.5
mAh, without affecting the successful rate of attacking. The results
show that the prototype spyware consumes very little power that
can hardly be noticed by the user.
Memory & CPU analysis. We test the memory consumption
of RocketGo on Google Pixel 2 and Galaxy S9, both of which has
4GB RAM. Fig.10 shows the average RAM consumption in the four
processes. On Samsung Galaxy S9, the RAM consumption of four
phases are 15MB, 22MB, 26MB, and 25MB, respectively, while on
Google Pixel 2, it consumes 17MB in P1, and 35MB in P2, P3, and P4.
Compared with video playing and listening to music, which con-
sumes 170 MB and 106 MB, respectively, the memory consump-
tion of RocketGo can hardly affects the performance of Android
systems, thus it is hard to be noticed by the user.
We also evaluate the CPU consumption on Google Pixel 2 ( with
1.9GHz octa-core processor) and Galaxy S9 (with 2.8 GHz octa-core
processor). It is found that only P3 is using the CPU to compute,
which consume around 7% of total bandwidth.
File size.We also evaluate the size of the app in different attack-
ing phases. During the whole attack process, two files are stored
on the disk: an audio file (*.pcm) to store the synthesised activation
voice, and three text files (*.txt) to record the data collected from
the sensors. Table.8 shows the average size of each files. As we pro-
cess the voice that we recorded in P2 in real-time, any recorded
voices that do not contain the activation words or syllables would
be abandoned, so that only the activation voice would be saved in
Figure 11: Detection result of Google Bouncer and Virus To-
tal
the audio file. In P3, the data collected from the sensors is stored
for X minute, and would then be overwritten by new data, to limit
the size of the app. In P4, attacking commands are fetched from
Firebase server in the format of texts, and convert to audio by us-
ing the built-in Text-To-Speech (TTS) services. The commands are
cached in RAM, so that no file is created in this phase.
Table 8: Average File Size (One File)
Voice Acceleration Light Noise
180.9 KB 91.7 KB 4.4 KB 5.4 KB
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Smarter Triggering Algorithm
The environment detection algorithms proposed in Section 4 in-
tend to make the attack more stealthy. The proposed attack can be
further improved to be more energy efficient. Once the activation
voice is synthesised, the environment detection algorithm keeps
collecting data from microphone, light sensor, and accelerometer.
As we discussed in Section 5, though the power consumption is
very low, it still has chance to be noticed by the user if it keeps
running for a long time. We observed that in the situations that
the environment detectionmodule decides to launch the attack, the
noise levels are higher than a certain threshold in most cases. As a
result, the noise level can be a preliminary indicator for the detec-
tion algorithm. On standby mode, only microphone is activated to
collect noise data, and once the noise level exceed a certain thresh-
old, the other two sensors then start to collect data. We have tested
that the power consumption can be further reduced from 0.8 mAh
to 0.4 mAh, which makes it even harder to be noticed by the user.
6.2 Essential Factors of the Attacking Success
Success in delivery. The abuse of high risk permissions in An-
droid apps making users insensitive to granting these permissions.
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For example, with the rise in popularity of location-based apps and
Augmented Reality (AR) games, user are becoming less cautious
when granting the permission to access the location and the cam-
era, both of which are high risk permissions that may leak your
private information. In our proof-of-concept attack, we disguise
the spyware as a microphone controlled game to fool the user for
granting the permission to access microphone. Success in avoid
being detected by anti-malware products. Currently, commer-
cial anti-malware tools are based on known features of malware,
such as signatures and sensitive operations. In our prototype spy-
ware, there are no relevant signatures in existing signature library
of anti-malware tools. All the sensitive operations in the attack,
such sending emails and making phone calls, are executed through
the Voice Assistant, which has privilege to access sensitive data,
and not being monitored by the anti-malware products.
To avoid being noticed by users. In the proposed attack, we
developed a stealthy attacking module, which monitors the envi-
ronment and looks for good time to launch the attack. It also ad-
justs the volume of the voice commands, to ensure that the voice
commands can be captured and recognised by the smartphone, but
cannot be heard by users.
6.3 Defence Approaches
Identify the source of the voice commands. In the proposed
attack scenario, the voice commands are played via the built-in
speaker on the smartphone. New techniques [21] are able to locate
the source of the sound, which then can determine whether the
sound comes from the built-in speaker. The voice assistant vendors
can disable the proposed attack by setting the voice assistant as not
to receive voice commands from the built-in speaker on its hosting
smartphone. However, this defence approach requires additional
devices to be worn, making it unrealistic for daily use.
Continuous authentication for voice assistants. [14] pro-
posed a scheme that collects the body-surface vibrations of the
user and matches it with the speech signal received by the voice
assistant’s microphone. The voice assistant executes only the com-
mands that originate from the voice of the owner. While it may
successfully defend the proposed attack, it also brings some in-
convenience to the user, for example, the user cannot activate the
voice assistant when they didn’t hold the smartphone. Actually,
users tend to interact with voice assistant when they are not able
to touch the screen, such as when they are driving.
Distinguish human voice from machine-based voice. [10]
explores the difference between a human voice and machine-based
voice based on themagnetic field emitted from loudspeakers,which
is able to detect machine-based voice impersonation attacks. How-
ever, false positive may be produced when there are other devices
around, which generates magnetic signals.
6.4 Lessons from This Work
In the newest Android OS version, there is a vulnerability ofGoogle
Assistant. Once the Google Assistant is activated, it can unlock the
screen, change smartphone settings, and do a lot of operations that
a human can do, such as sending SMS/emails and making phone
calls. Due to the privilege it has to access system resources and
private information, the Google Assistant can be a stepping stone
for the attackers to hack into the smartphones. Though the users
can turn off the âĂĲunlock with voice matchâĂİ option, which
requires the user to unlock the smartphone with PIN or finger-
prints before the Google Assistant can be launched, it is against the
"hands free" design target of the voice assistant. More secure mech-
anisms should be embedded to improve the security of the voice
assistant, both from the research community and the OS vendor.
7 RELATED WORK
7.1 Attack to Voice assistant
To date, there are some methods that are designed to hack voice as-
sistant. For example, Diao et al.[12] proposed an attacking method
based on built-in speakers, which collected the surrounding light
level as well as users’ movement in early morning. They utilised
the vulnerable inter-component communication ‘Intent (API: AC-
TION_VOICE_SEARCH_HANDS_FREE)’ [3] to launch attacks, inwhich
a recorded voice command will be played to control the smart
phones. Similar attacking methods are used in Efthimios and Con-
stantinos’s work [1], where a linked device to transfer voice feed-
back. However, for the works [1, 12] the vulnerable API can only
activate Google Assistant. It is not available for other voice assis-
tants such as Samsung Bixby [20] and Cortana[16].
There are also some researchers studiedmaking special audio to
launch attacks. For example, Nicholas et al. [9] proposed a method
to manipulate attacking audio. Their idea was to obfuscate the
raw audio and make it sound like a noise. Technically, human be-
ings might feel confused at the noise, but voice assistants embed-
ded in smartphones could still precisely recognise the meaning
of the manipulated audio. In another example, Zhang et al.[29]
presented a method to translate a TTS-based voice into an ultra-
sonic audio. They then directly played this inaudible audio to hack
voice assistants. In fact, smartphones can receive a high-frequency
sound waves, which cannot be heard by human beings (e.g. au-
dio frequency≥ 20kHz). Therefore, attackers can use the ultra-
sonic audio commands to control the voice assistant. This attack-
ing method needs an ultrasonic audio generator, which may not be
practical in many real world scenarios. In particular, their method
did not analyse the optimal attacking time. Therefore, the target-
ing user might be very vigilant when unsolicited window pop-up
happened during the attacks.
To implement a more realistic and powerful voice attack, we
build this stealthy spyware. The core differences are: 1) we use
a ‘smart’ algorithm to launch voice assistant in the daily use of
mobile phone; the proposed attacking method is simple and can
be applied to all types of voice assistants; 2) our attacking is more
stealthy as the developed spyware will detect and determine when
is the optimal attacking time.
7.2 Context-Awareness.
It has become ubiquitous for various sensors in our life. People
can utilise multi-sensors to predict human being’s activities [11].
For example, there is a multi-sensor based human activity detec-
tion method for smart homes [11, 24, 26]. They used wearable sen-
sors to collect data and adopted Coupled Hidden Markov Models
(CHMMs) to recognise multi-user activities from sensor readings
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in a smart home environment. The main limitation of these sys-
tems was that they provided activity information only when the
subject interacted with one of the tagged objects. Therefore, the
only recognisable activities were those that involved these objects.
Wiese et al.[27] presented an experiment to collect the sensor data
to analyse where people keep their smartphones. They utilised dif-
ferent combinations of sensors embedded in most smartphones
like accelerometer, proximity sensor, and light sensor to recognise
the places of smartphones. According to their research, there were
85% success rate to determine if a phone was in a bag, in a pocket,
out, or in hand. Liu et al.[22] proposed the sensor-based method to
recognise PINs when they were input by keyboard to smartwatch.
They mainly used accelerometer to recognise the PINs and typed
texts. They presented a set of new techniques to model user’s hand
movement and reduce the interference from noises. This attack
could achieve high accuracy in keystroke inference.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a stealthy attacking method targeting
VoiceAssistant on smartphones.With the proposedattackingmethod,
the attacker can activate the Voice Assistant and apply further at-
tacks, such as leaking private information, sending forged SMS/emails,
and calling arbitrary numbers. An Intelligent Environment Detec-
tion module is designed to choose a optimal attacking time, thus
can hide the attack from being noticed by users. Through our proof-
of-concept attack targeting Google Assistant on Android platform,
we demonstrated the feasibility of the attack in real-world scenar-
ios. This research may inspire the researchers and OS vendors re-
think the security of Voice Assistant.
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